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Abstract. We run a series of controlled field experiments on eBay where
buyers are rewarded for providing feedback. Our results suggest that the
feedback rate increases when a rebate is given, though the effect is small.
Moreover, the nature of buyer feedback is influenced by rewards: buyers
are more likely to give positive feedback following a high-quality transaction
(fast shipping) and less likely to give negative feedback following a low-
quality transaction (slow shipping). In sum, you can buy feedback but you
cannot buy unbiased feedback.
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1. Introduction
Customer feedback is an important component of a firm’s strategy. Given
the degree of seller anonymity in online trade platforms, customer feedback
is particularly important in this context. Studies of eBay buyer behavior
have shown that a seller’s past experience, as measured by the number and
quality of past feedback postings, is an important determinant of a seller’s
success, both in terms of number of bidders and size of bids (Cabral, 2012).
Given the importance of customer feedback, sellers have an interest in
encouraging buyers to post a review, in particular a positive review. Simi-
larly, online trade platform owners have an interest in fostering transactions
feedback to the extent that this improves the seller reputation mechanism
and thus increases buyer confidence.
In this paper, we consider one possible seller strategy: to provide buyers
with a rebate conditional on rating the quality of their transaction. By
establishing two eBay sellers who auction the same homogeneous good (a
USB pen drive), we are able to run a series of controlled field experiments
where we vary the degree to which buyers are rewarded for feedback, as well
as a component of the quality of the transaction (speed of shipment).
Our experiments address a series of research questions. First of all, we
inquire whether paying for feedback induces buyers to give more feedback.
We show that feedback frequency increases when it is rewarded, but the
effect is relatively small. A second important research question is whether
the nature of buyer feedback is altered by the fact a reward is offered by the
seller. It is possible that feedback rebates work as “bribes,” whereby buyers
feel compelled to provide better feedback than their experience would lead
them to. We show that, when the product sold is shipped slowly, some
buyers give negative feedback. However, the frequency of such negative
feedback is lower the greater the feedback reward, whereas the frequency
of positive feedback is greater. In other words, feedback rewards leads to a
considerable feedback bias.
Contrary to economic theory predictions, we show that feedback rewards
have no effect on bidding behavior, either the number of bidders or the aver-
age bid. This can be explained by buyer myopia, inattention, or incredulity
with respect to the sellers feedback reward offer.
On March 2012, China’s leading online trade platform, Taobao, started a
conditional feedback reward system, details of which are presented in Section
2. This development came to us as a surprise and was implemented well after
we designed and ran our field experiment. Although it refers to a different
trade platform (Taobao as opposed to eBay) and was designed in a slightly
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different way, the new Taobao scheme provides additional motivation and
relevance for our work.
Related Literature. A growing theoretical and empirical literature shows
that a seller’s reputation history is an important determinant of a seller’s
success, especially in online markets. Relevant contributions include Shapiro
(1983), Avery et al (1999), Dellarocas (2003), Bolton et al (2004), Houser
and Wooders (2006), Jin and Kato (2006), Resnick et al (2006), Cabral and
Hortac¸su (2010), Grosskopf and Sarin (2010). In online markets, reputation
systems usually rely on voluntary feedback from involved parties. This cre-
ates a problem of public good underprovision, for which various solutions
have been proposed. For example, Miller et al (2005) and Jurca and Faltings
(2007) propose truth-eliciting incentive schemes to induce buyers to report
and do so honestly. These mechanisms either require buyers or the market
(e.g., eBay) to bear the reporting cost. Given the importance of customer
feedback, sellers have an interest in encouraging buyers to post a review, so
sellers may have more incentive to bear the reporting cost than buyers or
the market.
Li (2010a) proposes a rebate mechanism in an online auction market:
sellers have the option of committing by providing a rebate (not necessarily
in monetary form) to cover the buyer’s reporting cost, regardless of whether
the feedback is positive or negative. In theory, this rebate mechanism plays
a dual role of incentivizing buyers to leave feedback and providing a device
for sellers to signal quality or effort to cooperate. In equilibrium, buyers will
not buy from the sellers who do not choose the rebate option and incorporate
the rebate amount into their bids.
Li and Xiao (2010) expand the rebate mechanism model to a listed-
price market and conduct a laboratory experiment to examine the effect of
the dollar rebate mechanism on market efficiency. They find that a seller’s
rebate offer increases buyers’ propensity to report in good transactions but
not in bad transactions; the dollar rebate does not affect the honesty of
the feedback; and the sellers’ rebate decisions affect the buyers’ purchasing
decisions by signaling the buyer about the sellers’ cooperative.
Monetary incentives are not the only way of inducing the desired buyer
behavior. For instance, Abeler et al (2010) find that apology is more ef-
fective than monetary incentives in making buyers withdraw their negative
feedback on eBay. Chen et al (2010a) run a field experiment on MovieLen-
s.com and find that effective personalized social information can increase the
level of public goods provision. Using data collected from Yelp.com, Wang
(2010) argues that social image and reviews’ productivities are positively
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correlated. Alternative ways of motivating agents are also explored in the
work of Be´nabou and Tirole (2003), Ariely et al (2009), Chen at al (2010b).
In this paper, we run a field experiment on eBay to test one possible
seller strategy: to provide buyers with a monetary rebate conditional on
rating the quality of their transaction. We are interested in investigating
whether paying for feedback induces buyers to give more feedback, whether
buyers bid higher when there is a rebate, and most important, whether the
nature of buyer feedback is altered by the fact a monetary reward is offered
by the seller.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the new
Taobao feedback reward system. While our experiment was ran on eBay,
we believe the Taobao system is sufficiently similar to our experiment to
warrant a detailed description. In Section 3, we describe the experiment’s
design. The results are presented in two sections: Section 4 includes basic
tabulations, whereas Section 5 includes regression results. Finally, Section
6 concludes the paper.
2. The new Taobao feedback reward scheme
As mentioned in the introduction, on March 2012 China’s leading online
trade platform, Taobao, started a conditional feedback reward system. This
development came to us as a surprise and was implemented well after we
designed and ran our field experiment. Although it refers to a different
trade platform (Taobao as opposed to eBay) and was designed in a slightly
different way, the new Taobao scheme provides additional motivation and
relevance for our work. In this section, we describe Taobao and its reward
system in greater detail.
Launched in 2003, Taobao Marketplace (www.taobao.com) is the most
popular consumer-to-consumer (C2C) online marketplace in China with n-
early 500 million registered users.1 On an average day, more than 60 million
visitors have access to more than 800 million product listings; on an aver-
age minute, 48 thousands products are sold. By the end of 2011, the peak
daily transaction value was 4.38 billion RMB; and Taobao’s market share
was estimated to be 90.4% of a total Chinese C2C market sales of 59.4
billion RMB.2 According to Alexa and DoubleClick Ad Planner by Google
site rankings, Taobao Marketplace is one of the world’s top 20 most visited
1. Note these are not unique registered users. The number of Chinese online-shoppers
was estimated to be 187 million in 2011, with a forecast of 363 million by 2015.
2. http://ec.iresearch.cn/17/20120112/161325.shtml, accessed on June 24, 2012.
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Figure 1
Taobao’s announcement of a new feedback reward system
The purpose of the “rebate for feedback” scheme is to:
• Increase the ratio of non-automatic to automatic seller ratings.
• Increase the quality of buyers’ comments.
• Increase feedback for new products and thus reduce buyers’ hesitation to
purchase.
Benefits for buyers:
• Receive cash or a coupon as a reward for feedback.
• Become opinion leader as the display of their feedback is prioritized over others’
feedback.
Benefits for sellers:
• Increase ratio of non-automatic to automatic ratings, thus attracting more
future buyers.
• Increase buyer incentives to write detailed comments, thus increasing
word-of-mouth marketing power.
Sellers can set:
• Reward for 1st high-quality feedback on newly listed products.
• Reward for any products, conditional on feedback being of high quality (and
regardless of whether it is positive or negative).
Alternative form of rewards:
• Cash rewards.
• Discount coupon.
4
Figure 2
Taobao.com page with feedback reward scheme
websites.3
On March 1, 2012, Taobao launched a “Rebates for Feedback” seller
option. If a seller chooses this option, the seller sets a rebate value (in the
form of cash or a coupon) as part of their listings. Then Taobao makes
sure the rebate is transferred from the seller’s account to a buyer who leaves
high-quality feedback. Feedback quality does not depends on whether the
feedback is positive or negative; rather, it depends on how informative it is,
a quality that Taobao measures with a machine algorithm that examines the
comment’s content and length, finds out whether key features of the item
are mentioned, and so on.
Figure 1 shows Taobao’s announcement of the new online service (our
translation). Some notes are in order. One of the announced goals is to
“increase the ratio of non-automatic ratings for sellers.” To understand this,
we note that in Taobao, if a buyer does not leave any feedback after the seller
leaves feedback, the the system will help the buyer to leave an automatic
positive rating to the seller. Second, the goal of increasing “the quality of
buyers’ comments” is related to Taobao’s use of a machine algorithm to
judge feedback quality. Finally, with respect to Taobao’s role in helping the
seller offer a rebate, the seller deposits a certain amount for a chosen period
and Taobao freezes the deposit until the end of the period.
According to Taobao’s own survey (published in March, 2012), 64.8%
of buyers think that they will be more willing to buy the items which have
3. Source: http://www.taobao.com/about/intro.php, accessed June 24, 2012.
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Figure 3
Kingston 2GB USB pen drive
“rebate for feedback” feature, and 84.2% of buyers think that the “rebate for
feedback” option will make them more likely to write detailed comments.4
Figure 2 shows a typical Taobao.com page with the new feedback reward
scheme.5 The box just below the 4.9 score includes a feedback reminder. It
reads
Dear customer, you will have a chance to get 0.50 RMB reward,
if you leave feedback conscientiously on the product from April
19–27, 2012.
The box on the lower right corner, in turn, includes a notice that this buyer
has been awarded 0.50 RMB rebate for her feedback:
This comment is informative, so it is rewarded with 0.50 RMB.
3. Field experiment design
To examine the effects of monetary rebates on feedback behavior, we sold
new Kingston 2GB USB pen drives on eBay (Figure 3). We chose to sell
this particular product because it is a relatively standard product and it is
sold by several other sellers.6 We chose to conduct the field experiment on
eBay because it is the world’s largest online auction market and has been
the object of numerous complementary studies and experiments.7
4. http://bbs.taobao.com/catalog/thread/513886-256229600.htm, accessed June 24,
2012.
5. http://bbs.taobao.com/catalog/thread/513886-256229600.htm, accessed March 29,
2012.
6. One difficulty we we experienced was that Kingston stopped producing the 2GB
USB drives halfway throughout our experiment. We tried very hard to purchase
the same model USB drives around the world so as to continue selling the same
object.
7. See for example Dellarocas and Wood (2008); Brow and Morgan (2006); Resnick
et al (2006); Brown et al (2010); Li (2010b).
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Table 1
Field experiment treatments
No Rebate $1 Rebate $2 Rebate
Fast shipment F0 F1 F2
Slow shipment S0 S1 S2
We registered two IDs on eBay and accumulated 75 positive feedback
scores on each ID from buying and selling the Kingston pen drive. In this
way, before beginning our experiment, we had two sellers with similar, es-
tablished records. So as to avoid being identified as “experiment” sellers,
we operated the two IDs on different days. Considering that there is a large
number of sellers of the same object, our two IDs typically did not show on
the same search page.
We created several treatments, with characteristics that vary along t-
wo dimensions. First, in different treatments we offered different levels of
feedback rebate: 0, $1 and $2 per feedback. We clearly stated the rebate
amount of $1 or $2 in the item listing title. Specifically, we used the title
“Brand New Kingston 2GB USB Flash Drive” for a no rebate listing and
“Brand New Kingston 2GB USB Flash Drive ($1 rebate available)” for $1
rebate listing (and the analogous title one for a $2 rebate). In the listings
with a rebate, we added the sentence
Rebate option. Your feedback is important to us; please give
us your honest feedback and receive a $1 credit in your Paypal
account.
The second dimension that distinguishes different treatments is transac-
tion quality. Specifically, we provided the identical USB drives with different
speeds of shipment. For a “fast” transaction, we shipped the USB drive im-
mediately upon receiving payment. For a “slow” transaction, we shipped
the USB drive two weeks after sale.
Together, rebate value (0,1,2) and shipment speed (F,S) create six differ-
ent possibilities, as listed on Table 1. For example, treatment F1 corresponds
to Fast shipping speed and a $1 rebate, while treatment S0 corresponds to
Slow shipping and no rebate offered.
Our experiment may be chronologically divided into 4 phases, as listed
on Table 2. In Phase 1, our RA mistakenly offered a $1 rebate right after
receiving payment and before buyer feedback was received. For most of the
paper, we do not include Phase 1’s data into our analysis of conditional
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Table 2
Field experiment chronology
Phase Dates Seller ID Type # obs.
Phase 1 2010/02/23 – 2010/05/08 1 F1∗, F0 30
2 F1∗, F0 30
Phase 2 2010/06/10 – 2010/08/19 1 F1, F0 30
2 F1, F0 30
Phase 3 2010/10/06 – 2011/01/11 1 F2, F0 30
2 S1, S0 31
Phase 4 2011/04/06 – 2011/09/01 1 S2, S0 20
feedback rebates. However, we later return to the data from this phase.
By the time we started Phase 2, both of our eBay IDs had 100+ positive
feedback scores. In Phase 2 we offered the same feedback reward as in
Phase 1, but we consistently made such rebate conditional on receiving
buyer feedback. Thus Phase 2 corresponds to the F1 treatment (and F0 as
well, for we only offered a feedback reward on some transactions).
In Phase 3, our two hitherto similar sellers took different paths. For
seller ID1 we switched to an F2 treatment, that is, we increased the value of
the rebate from $1 to $2. For seller ID2 we switched to a 2-week shipment
while keeping the $1 rebate. Finally, in Phase 3 seller ID1 switched from
fast to slow shipment, while keeping the $2 rebate.8
Table 3 displays basic descriptive statistics of the data generated by
the experiment’s various phases. We should also mention that, of the 205
transactions, in only 3 instances did the same buyer repeat a purchase from
the same seller (there are a total of 17 repeat buyer sales in our data set,
but most correspond to the same buyer purchasing from different sellers).
4. Results: tabulation
In this section, we present the main results from our experiment. We group
them into several subsections. First, we investigate whether offering a feed-
8. Some buyers filed complaints with eBay regarding slow shipping by our seller ID2,
so that it no longer met the minimal “detailed seller rating requirements” in the
“Seller performance standards.” As a result, ID2 was not operating during our
Phase 4.
9. For feedback-received transactions only.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean St dev Min Max
Rebate 201 0.687 0.719 0 2
Price 201 3.823 1.573 1.04 11
Bidder count 201 4.000 1.338 2 8
Bid count 201 5.841 2.227 2 14
Bidder score 201 350 700 0 6454
Bidder positive perc. 201 0.983 0.107 0 1
Seller score 201 112 22 75 151
Seller positive perc. 201 0.998 0.007 0.956 1
Feedback 201 0.682 0.555 -1 1
Feedback lag (days)9 155 13.355 9.575 0 54
back rebate induces buyers to give feedback more frequently. Next we look
at the nature of feedback, that is, whether it becomes more favorable to the
seller (conditional on transaction quality). Additional questions addressed
by our study include the speed of buyer feedback and whether the expecta-
tion of a rebate changes bidding behavior.
A penny for your thoughts. The first research question in which we are
interested is whether paying for feedback induces buyers to give feedback
more frequently. Table 4 tabulates the frequency of feedback for different
types of feedback policy. Restricting to fast shipment transactions, the
percentage of transactions where feedback is given increases from 76.09%
to 79.31% as we move from no rebate to a $1 conditional rebate, and from
79.31% to 93.33% as we switch from a $1 to $2 conditional rebate.
In other words, our results suggest that feedback rewards induce higher
feedback rates, though weakly: when we offer $1 for customer feedback we
don’t observe a significant increase in the feedback rate; a $2 reward however
leads to an increase in the feedback rate that is economically and statistically
significant.
Can buy me love. The next question of interest is whether the nature
of buyer feedback is altered by the fact that a reward is offered by the
seller. In other words, we now inquire whether feedback rebates work as
“bribes,” whereby buyers feel compelled to provide better feedback than
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Table 4
Feedback behavior fast shipment transactions
Feedback reward → None $1 $2
Outcome ↓ # % # % # %
No feedback given 11 24 6 21 1 7
Some feedback given 35 76 23 79 14 93
Total 44 100 29 100 15 100
Positive 35 100 23 100 14 100
Negative 0 0 0 0 0 0
Neutral 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5
Feedback behavior in slow shipment transactions
Feedback reward → None $1 $2
Outcome ↓ # % # % # %
No feedback given 8 40 4 25 4 27
Some feedback given 12 60 12 75 11 73
Total 20 100 16 100 15 100
Positive 7 58 9 75 10 91
Negative 2 17 2 17 0 0
Neutral 3 25 1 8 1 9
Negative or Neutral 5 42 3 25 1 9
their experience would lead them to.
Within the set of fast shipment transactions, our results are inconclusive
because all feedback was positive. This limitation of our first treatments lead
us to consider a second set of treatments. We purposely shipped our USB
drive more slowly (exactly 14 days after receiving payment) and repeated
the shift from no feedback to $1 and $2 conditional feedback (treatments S1
and S2, respectively).
Table 5 displays the results from this new treatment. As a prelimi-
nary question, we ask whether the lowering of service quality has any effect
on the type of feedback received. The answer is clearly yes: whereas our
fast-shipping transactions received exclusively positive feedback, our slow-
shipping transactions received 4 negative feedback messages (and 9 negative
or neutral feedback messages). Using a t-test, we confirm that the negative
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feedback rate following a slow shipment transaction is statistically different
from the negative feedback rate following a fast shipment transaction (t =
-3.6).10,11
Table 5 also shows that, as before, higher feedback rewards increase
feedback frequency (from 60% to about 75%). The novel test that Table 5
allows for is whether paying for feedback alters the nature of feedback. We
observe that as we shift from no rebate to a $1 or $2 rebate the percentage
of positive feedbacks within transactions with feedback increases.
In sum, you can buy feedback but you may not be able to buy unbiased
feedback.
The Avengers. Do feedback payments change the timing of feedback?
To the extent that buyers have positive discount, we should expect that
feedback rebates lead buyers to leave feedback quicker. To the extent that
buyers want to reciprocate sellers for the kindness of providing feedback,
we also expect quicker feedback when rebates are offered.12 Regarding the
quality of the transaction, previous literature has shown that there is such
a thing as demand for justice.13 In the present context, this would lead us
to expect that delayed transactions create a greater demand for feedback
(especially negative feedback), and that this would be given quicker.
Figure 4 presents summary data that addresses the above possibilities.
We compute the variable “Days To Received Feedback” by computing the
difference between “Date Feedback Left” and “Auction End Date.” In the
case of delayed auctions, we subtract an extra 14 days to account for the
delay in shipping with respect to fast shipment transactions.
The results suggest that paying for feedback has little effect on the speed
of feedback (though the sign of the change is in accordance to the theory pre-
diction). Regarding transaction quality, we also observe an effect consistent
10. The same is true if we consider both neutral and negative feedback as negative
feedback (t = -5.6412).
11. As an aside, we note that the lack of negative feedback for Normal transactions
should not be ascribed to “fear of retaliation,” as several authors have previously
argued. First, we (the seller) always give positive feedback promptly, so buyers
have no reason to fear retaliation. Second, we do observe an increase in negative
feedback as we reduce service quality.
12. See Fehr and Ga¨chter( 2000b) and Dellarocas and Wood (2008) for more literature
on positive Reciprocity.
13. See for example de Quervain et al. 2004; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000a; Xiao and
Houser, 2005.
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Figure 4
Average number of days before feedback is received
with theory: buyers are quicker when giving feedback on a bad transaction.14
Free lunch. Different bidders have different costs of providing feedback.
As suggested by the results above, even when no rebate is given, a consid-
erable fraction of buyers do provide feedback. Therefore, when the seller
pays for feedback to any buyer who is willing to do so, the marginal effect
of such a payment is small in the sense that only a few buyers switch from
not giving feedback to giving feedback. For this reason, it might seem that
obtaining those marginal feedbacks comes at a very high cost (that is, a
large amount of feedback discounts are given for a small number of extra
feedbacks). However, a forward looking buyer with zero feedback cost —
one who would give feedback regardless of the rebate — should anticipate
a gain of $1 or $2 (as the case may be) and this anticipated gain should be
reflected in his or her bid. In other words, theory would predict that the
seller’s cost of paying for feedback is largely recovered in the form of higher
bids.
Accordingly, we now test the prediction that feedback rewards lead to
14. The average days for leaving negative and neural feedback is 4.7, while the average
days for leaving positive feedback is 11.2 in phase 2-4. When we include all phases,
the average days are 4.7 and 10.5, respectively.
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Table 6
Feedback reward and bidding behavior
Rebate ($) 0 1 2
Average price 3.44 3.51 3.15
Bidder count 3.65 3.82 3.53
Bid count 5.26 5.53 4.97
N 66 45 30
higher bids. Table 6 shows the average price, bidder count, and number of
bids for each treatment in Phases 2–4.15 The data suggests that, contrary
to the theory prediction, there is not much difference in bidding behavior
resulting from rebate promises.
A related research question pertains to the number of bidders. Again,
Table 6 suggests that feedback rebates have no effect.
There are several interpretations for this absence of an effect. One is
that buyers are myopic, in the sense that at the time of bidding they do not
take into account the future saving provided by the feedback rebate. An
alternative explanation is that buyers are incredulous about the feedback
rebate offers. Still another alternative explanation is that buyers are simply
unaware of the feedback rebate promise. In the next subsection we provide
evidence that helps tease out among these alternative explanations.
Show me the money. As mentioned earlier, a communications error
led our RA to mistakenly offer a $1 rebate before receiving feedback during
an initial stage of our experiment. We denoted this phase as Phase 1 and
decided not to use it for our statistical tests (to the extent that we are inter-
ested in the effect of conditional feedback rebates). However, we decided this
was a good opportunity to “turn lemons into lemonade:” our unintentional
mistake provides a test of whether or not the conditionality of the feedback
rebate (on actually receiving feedback) plays a role.
Both Phases 1 and 2 contain 60 fast-shipping transactions. In both
cases we have 12 transactions with no feedback and the remaining 48 with
positive feedback. In other words, in terms of frequency and type of feedback
the two phases are identical: the conditionality of feedback seems to have
no effect on incentives to give feedback. Moreover, restricting to the 48
transactions when feedback was given, we observe that the mean number of
15. The results do not change if we include Phase 1’s data as well.
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days before feedback is given is lower when the rebate is given after feedback.
Specifically, we use a one tail t-test and Pr(T > t) = 0.0610.
Together, these results suggest that incentives do not seem to play an
important role, either because buyers are unaware or incredulous about the
seller’s offer, or because reciprocity considerations play a bigger role than
economic incentives. According to Be´nabou and Tirole (2003),
A central tenet of economics is that individuals respond to in-
centives. For psychologists and sociologists, in contrast, rewards
and punishments are often counterproductive, because they un-
dermine intrinsic motivation.
Our study suggests that the effects of conditional feedback go beyond those
of economic incentives; in fact, they may primarily consist of motivational
incentives.
5. Results: regression analysis
In this section, we turn to regression analysis. While the analysis in the
previous section allows for a first glance at the statistical and economic
significance of the various treatments, multivariate regression analysis has
the advantage of teasing out the effects of the various explanatory variables.
Moreover, by pooling the results of various treatments, we are able to work
with a greater number of observations and thus perform more powerful tests.
The last subsection in the previous section suggests that our mistake
of having offered the feedback rebate before feedback was received did not
have much of an impact on feedback behavior. Motivated by this result, we
include Phase 1 in the dataset we use for multivariate regression analysis.
However, we control for phase fixed effects to allow for the possibility that
there is an effect we were unable to measure in our earlier data tabulation.
We consider two sets of regressions. The first one deals with feedback
behavior, while the second one deals with bidding behavior. Our results
regarding feedback behavior are presented in Table 7. The first regression
looks at the effects on the rate of feedback behavior (regardless of type of
feedback). The results suggest that conditional rebates have an effect that
is positive but not statistically significant. The effect of slow shipping is
significantly negative. Together, these results seem consistent with the idea
that buyers provide positive feedback with a high rate when the seller gives
positive feedback to begin with (as we did). Further increasing the rate of
positive feedback is difficult even if rebates are offered. However, lowering
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Table 7
Regression analysis of feedback behavior
Dependent variable Some
feedback
Positive
feedback
Negative
feedback
Negative
feedback
Feedback
(-1,0,1)
Days till
feedback
Regression type Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS OLS
$1 rebate 0.394
(0.95)
0.470
(1.16)
-0.733
(-0.75)
-0.010
(-0.32)
0.0915
(1.11)
-0.633
(-0.43)
$2 rebate 0.633
(0.83)
1.266
(1.60)
-2.024
(-1.30)
-0.096
(-1.64)
0.311∗∗
(2.03)
0.629
(0.23)
Slow shipping -2.075∗∗
(-2.22)
-2.669∗∗∗
(2.88)
0.000
(omitted)
0.170∗∗
(2.37)
-0.587∗∗∗
(-3.14)
-6.792∗∗
(-2.05)
Seller score -0.322∗∗∗
(-3.41)
-0.233∗∗
(-2.57)
1.002
(1.33)
0.00222
(0.90)
-0.0120∗
(-1.86)
-0.112
(-0.98)
Seller’s perfect record 0.476
(0.43)
-0.504
(-0.50)
2.402
(1.60)
0.105
(1.46)
-0.477∗∗
(-2.54)
1.208
(0.36)
Date 0.0779∗∗∗
(3.08)
0.0476∗∗
(2.01)
-0.0564
(-0.68)
0.00000546
(0.10)
0.0000367
(0.26)
0.000345
(0.14)
Seller and phase F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Constant -3109.3∗∗∗
(-3.07)
-1893.3∗∗
(-2.00)
2148.4
(0.66)
-0.509
(-0.23)
0.803
(0.14)
2.062
(0.02)
N 201 201 51 201 201 201
Adj. R2 0.125 0.168 0.030
Pseudo R2 0.100 0.144 0.225
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the quality of a transaction does have the effect of decreasing the buyers’
propensity to give (positive) feedback. The first regression also suggests that
the seller’s eBay score (number of positive feedbacks previously received)
has a negative effect on the likelihood of receiving feedback. We have no
clear explanation why this is the case. One possibility is that the buyer
internalizes the fact that feedback is more valuable to less experienced sellers.
Finally, time has a positive effect on feedback giving, which possibly reflects
a behavioral trend on eBay.
In the second regression we look specifically at positive feedback. The
results suggest that the effect of conditional rebates is greater than when
we consider any form of feedback. However, the statistical significance of
the coefficients is marginal at best. The p value for the $2 rebate variable
is 11%. The results also confirm that lower quality transactions lead to less
positive feedback. We continue to observe a negative effect of the sellers
historical store and a positive effect of time.
In the third and forth regressions, we look at the determinants of negative
feedback. Following previous evidence that neutral feedback is commonly
interpreted as negative, we pool neutral and negative feedbacks into one
single category, which we call “negative.”16 The third regression, like the
first two ones, uses a logit model. The coefficient of slow shipping cannot
be estimated: recall that there are only negative feedback messages when
slow shipping is turned on. In order to obtain an idea of the effect of slow
shipping, we use an OLS model instead (fourth regression). Although the
standard error estimates are not unbiased, the results suggest nevertheless
that slow shipping is an important determinant of negative feedback. This is
not surprising, and it shows that feedback is not purely arbitrary, that is, it
has informational content. It is also interesting to observe that the coefficient
on a $2 conditional rebate is negative and significant (both statistically and
economically). This suggests that conditional feedback rebates can be a
form of “buying” silence from disgruntled buyers.
In the fifth regression we consider a dependent variable, Feedback, which
is defined as follows. If the feedback is positive, then Feedback=1. If the
feedback is negative or neutral, then Feedback=-1. Finally, if no feedback
is given then Feedback=0. This regression allows us to detect biases in the
nature of feedback. Consistently with the previous regression, the coefficient
on slow shipping and negative (and statistically significant): buyers’ feed-
back reflects transaction quality. However, we also observe a positive (and
statistically significant) coefficient on the $2 rebate variable. This suggests
16. See for example Cabral and Hortac¸su (2010).
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Table 8
Regression analysis of bidding behavior (all OLS regressions)
Dependent variable Price Number of
bidders
Number of
bids
$1 rebate -0.00536
(-0.02)
-0.0550
(-0.27)
-0.0226
(-0.07)
$2 rebate 0.178
(0.47)
0.154
(0.46)
-0.103
(-0.18)
Slow shipping 0.525
(1.41)
0.486
(1.48)
1.646∗∗∗
(3.01)
Seller score -0.0387∗∗∗
(-5.32)
-0.0274∗∗∗
(-4.27)
-0.0540∗∗∗
(-5.07)
Seller’s perfect record 0.0389
(0.08)
0.177
(0.43)
0.722
(1.05)
Date 0.000521
(1.30)
0.000154
(0.44)
0.000454
(0.77)
Seller F.E. Y Y Y
Constant -13.11
(-0.82)
0.511
(0.04)
-7.978
(-0.34)
N 201 201 201
Adj. R2 0.152 0.089 0.130
that conditional feedback rebates not only influence the rate of feedback but
also the nature of feedback, biasing it towards positive feedback.
Finally, the sixth regression looks at the determinants of speed of feed-
back. This regression suggests that buyers leave feedback quicker for slow-
shipping transactions than for fast-shipping transactions. This confirms our
observations in the previous section.
We next turn to the second set of regressions, the results of which are
reported in Table 8. Differently from the previous set of regressions, we do
not include phase fixed effects. In particular, the fact that feedback was
(mistakenly) given before feedback was received (in Phase 1) should have
no effect on bidding behavior. We do keep, however, seller fixed effects.
The first regression looks at the determinants of sale price. Contrary to
theory (and in accordance with the earlier tabulation results) we see that
feedback rebates have no significant effect on price. The regression coeffi-
cients have the right sign but are not statistically significant. We do observe,
however, a very significant negative coefficient on the variable seller score,
similarly to the first set of equations. In this case, the sign of the coefficient
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Figure 5
Outcome percentages per treatment
is particularly striking as standard reputation theories would predict it to be
positive. The coefficient of the variable “Seller perfect score,” which theory
would predict to have a positive sign, is not significantly different from zero
(and has a negative sign).
A similar pattern is observed in the second and third regressions, where
the only statistically significant coefficient is that of seller score and with
a negative sign. Since the seller score steadily increases over time, one
might think that this variable is measuring something else than the buyers’
estimate of the seller’s value. However, we include the calendar date in all
regressions and this variable seems not to be significant. The negative effect
of seller score remains a puzzle to us.
6. Discussion and concluding remarks
Figure 5 summarizes the main results in the paper. The top three treatments
correspond to fast shipping transactions. As can be seen, all feedback re-
ceived was positive. In this context, paying for feedback is effectively paying
for positive feedback. The figure suggest that, the more we pay for feed-
back, the more likely (positive) feedback is received. However, to the extent
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that the probability of (positive) feedback is large to begin with, paying for
feedback does not have a very significant effect on the outcome. In a sense,
providing a good service — and offering the buyer positive feedback, as we
did — is a good substitute for paying for feedback.
Things change as we move to the slow shipping treatments (the bottom
three treatments in Figure 5). Now we observe negative and neutral feedback
(both of which we treat as negative feedback). The effect of paying for
feedback is now two-fold: it decreases the number of negative feedbacks
and increases the number of positive feedbacks. The net result on the total
number of feedbacks is positive but small.
Whereas treatments F0–F2 might suggest that buyers are being paid for
the cost of giving feedback, treatments S0–S2 clearly suggest that paying
for feedback alters the nature of feedback: disgruntled buyers are silenced
by a feedback rebate, even though we explicitly state that the rebate is
conditional on giving feedback, not on giving a particular form of feedback.
All in all, our results suggest that it is possible to increase the feedback
rate by means of giving conditional feedback rebates. However, this is a
rather costly means of obtaining feedback. Moreover, it is likely that the
nature of feedback will be considerably affected by rebates: you can buy
feedback but you cannot buy unbiased feedback.
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